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Morgenbesser’s Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components 
 
Is A ∧ C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the 
case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative 
counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of 
Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s 
counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying 
Bennett’s counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More 
generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to the 
sufficiency of A ∧ C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. 
 
1. Introduction 
Does the truth of A ∧ C suffice for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual ‘if A 
were the case, then C would be the case’ (A > C)? That is, does the schema 
 
Conjunction Conditionalization: (A ∧ C) → (A > C) 
 
hold? Conjunction Conditionalization is an axiom of Pollock’s SS (1976, pp. 42-43) 
and hence a theorem of the stronger logics of Lewis (1986, p. 132) and Stalnaker 
(1968, p. 48) and is validated by a range of semantics including Lewis’s. Despite this, 
Conjunction Conditionalization is controversial and many reject it. Indeed, Lewis 
(1986, p. 22) himself considers rejecting it. 
 
If Conjunction Conditionalization is false, then these standard logics and a range of 
semantics have to go. Moreover, Conjunction Conditionalization has ramifications for 
other logical principles. For example, Conjunction Conditionalization cannot plausibly 
be maintained with either of 
 
Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA): 
((A ∨ B) > C) → ((A > C) ∧ (B > C)) 
 
Universalization of Existential Antecedents (UEA): 
(((∃x) Fx) > C) → ((∀x) (Fx > C)) 
 
contra Loewer (1976, p. 533) who states that the invalidity of Conjunction 
Conditionalization ‘has nothing to do with the validity of (SDA)’.  
 
Proof: A ∧ C entails (A ∨ B) ∧ C, giving (A ∨ B) > C by Conjunction 
Conditionalization. By (SDA), this gives B > C, for any B, erroneously making the 
truth of the consequent sufficient for the truth of a counterfactual. So (SDA) is false if 
Conjunction Conditionalization holds (cf. Butcher 1983, p. 75). Similarly, (UEA) fails 
assuming Conjunction Conditionalization, as (∀x) (Fx > C) is not, in general, required 
for the truth of (∃x) (Fx) ∧ C. 
 
Although many now reject (SDA) and (UEA), both principles still have their 
adherents: Studtmann (2003, p. 56 n2) explicitly endorses (SDA), and (UEA) is, I 
think, implicit in McDermott’s 2007. 
 
Conjunction Conditionalization also plausibly validates 
 
Counterfactual Modus Ponens (CMP): 
(A ∧ (A > C)) → C 
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A counterexample to (CMP) must have the following form A ∧ (A > C) ∧ ¬C, so that 
application of (CMP) gives rise to a contradiction. But given Conjunction 
Conditionalization, we can conclude A > ¬C from A ∧ (A > C) ∧ ¬C and thus A ∧ (A > 
C) ∧ (A > ¬C). But this yields a contradiction given the following principle 
 
Exclusion: ◊A → (¬((A > C) ∧ (A > ¬C))) 
 
Exclusion is validated by a range of semantics for counterfactuals and is, in any 
case, overwhelmingly plausible. So if we can establish Conjunction 
Conditionalization, then we validate (CMP) contra Lycan (2001). 
 
The status of Conjunction Conditionalization is also of independent philosophical 
interest. For example, both Sosa’s (1999, p. 142) formulation of safety, ‘if S were to 
believe P, then it would be the case that P’, and Nozick’s (1981) fourth condition on 
knowledge, ‘if P were the case, then S would believe P’, add nothing to the true belief 
condition on knowledge, if Conjunction Conditionalization is valid.1 
 
In the next section, I consider Jonathan Bennett’s putative counterexample to 
Conjunction Conditionalization, and show that we need not accept it. In §3 I argue 
that we should in fact reject Bennett’s counterexample and that the principles which 
underwrite his counterexample are unmotivated and indeed false. Finally, in §4, I 
generalize the argument to the conclusion that Conjunction Conditionalization is true. 
 
 
2. Bennett on counterfactuals with true components 
Jonathan Bennett (2003, §92) rejects Conjunction Conditionalization in 
indeterministic contexts. In particular, he rejects 
 
Coin: If I had tossed the coin at t, the coin would have landed heads 
 
when in fact I did toss an indeterministic coin at t and it did land heads. To see why 
Bennett rejects Coin, we must examine two further counterfactuals. First, consider 
the case of Morgenbesser’s coin (Slote 1978, p.27 n33): I toss an indeterministic 
coin, and whilst the coin is in mid-air, I offer you good odds that it will come up heads. 
You decline the bet and the coin lands heads. The following is then true 
 
Morgenbesser: If you had bet heads, you would have won2 
 
Now consider an example of Tichý’s (1976). Suppose Fred invariably takes his hat 
when it rains but takes it only 50% of the time when it is fine. It is raining and so Fred 
has his hat. But 
 
Tichý: If it had not been raining, Fred would have taken his hat 
 
                                                 
1
 Sosa (1999) provides non-equivalent formulations of safety but needs the formulation in the 
text as he wants safety to be the contrapositive of sensitivity: ‘if P were not the case, then S 
would not believe P’ (1999, p. 148). 
2
 Bennett only explicitly rejects the forward-looking analogue of Coin, ‘If you were to toss the 
coin, it would fall heads’ (2003, p. 240). However, as we shall see, his reasons for doing so 
also carry over to Coin, since tense plays no role. More generally, it seems tense plays no 
significant role for Bennett; he explicitly endorses both Morgenbesser (2003, pp. 234-235) 
and its forward looking analogue ‘if you were to bet on heads, you would win’ (2003, p. 240) 
and says of the latter ‘It was based on a sheer guess, and was not a reasonable thing for me 
to say; but it was true’ (2003, p. 240). Tense, then, is relevant to assertibility but not to truth. 
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is false. Between them Morgenbesser and Tichý show that some, but not all post-
antecedent facts should be held fixed when considering counterfactuals. 
 
Bennett accounts for the difference between Morgenbesser and Tichý in his Lewis-
style possible worlds semantics by appealing to 
 
Causal Independence: If ¬A and C obtain at the actual world and these two 
facts are causally unrelated to one another, then C also obtains at the closest 
A-worlds. From this it follows that A > C (2003, p. 237). 
 
The coin landing heads is causally independent of whether you bet, so the closest 
worlds in which you bet are ones in which the coin lands heads. This is sufficient to 
make Morgenbesser true.  
 
As it stands, however, Causal Independence is silent on cases where A and C are 
causally related and so does not explain our verdict on Tichý. What Bennett needs is 
 
Causal Independence*: If ¬A and C obtain at the actual world, then C obtains 
at the closest A-worlds iff these two facts are causally unrelated to one 
another. From this it follows that A > C. 
 
Since Fred’s taking his hat is causally related to the weather, this fact is not held 
fixed when assessing Tichý. In terms of Lewis’s framework, Fred takes his hat in 
some closest not-rain-worlds, but in others he does not, and this is sufficient to make 
Tichý false. 
 
The relevance of all this to Conjunction Conditionalization, is that Bennett sticks to 
this line of reasoning when the antecedent is true. That is, in addition to Causal 
Independence, Bennett subscribes to 
 
The Irrelevance Principle: ‘When A and C are both true, and the causation of C 
is indeterministic, A > C is true just in case A is irrelevant to the causal chain 
that leads to C’s obtaining’ (2003, p. 240). 
 
Given that in Coin the antecedent is relevant to the causal chain leading to the 
consequent, The Irrelevance Principle makes Coin, and hence Conjunction 
Conditionalization, false. 
 
Note that as a biconditional, The Irrelevance Principle is the true antecedent 
analogue of Causal Independence* rather than Causal Independence. So without 
Causal Independence*, The Irrelevance Principle is unmotivated. And Bennett needs 
both directions of The Irrelevance Principle as it is the claim that A > C is true when A 
∧ C only if A is irrelevant to C that allows him to reject Coin. 
 
The Irrelevance Principle and the falsity of Coin, however, are each inconsistent with 
Bennett’s official way of accommodating the distinction between Morgenbesser and 
Tichý, which is not given by Causal Independence, but by 
 
Causal Chain: A post-antecedent fact contributes to the closeness of a world, 
w, to the actual world iff it obtains in w through same causal chain as it does in 
the actual world (2003, pp. 235, 299, 328). 
 
But, if A indeterminisitically causes C, then, by Causal Chain, A-worlds where C 
obtains through this same causal chain are closer to actuality than other A-worlds 
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including (A ∧ ¬C)-worlds. So Conjunction Conditionalization and Coin are true by 
Causal Chain and The Irrelevance Principle false. 
 
More importantly, Bennett’s argument against Coin and Conjunction 
Conditionalization rested on what he took to be a generalization of the principle 
underlying our judgements about Morgenbesser and Tichý. However, Causal Chain 
also underwrites these judgements, but supports Coin and Conjunction 
Conditionalization.3 Consideration of Morgenbesser and Tichý alone then, does not 
decide the truth of Coin. Given that The Irrelevance Principle is under motivated, 
Bennett has no argument against Coin and Conjunction Conditionalization, and so 




3. An Argument from Morgenbesser to Coin 
The following principles are theorems in the standard counterfactual logics and valid 
on a range of semantics 
 
Limited Transitivity: ((A > B) ∧ ((A ∧ B) > C)) → (A > C) 
 
Substitution: ((A > B) ∧ (B > A) ∧ (A > C)) → (B > C) 
  
Gloss on Limited Transitivity: if the closest A-worlds are B-worlds, then the closest (A 
∧ B)-worlds are the closest A-worlds, so C obtains at the former worlds iff it obtains at 
the latter worlds. Similarly for Substitution: if the closest A-worlds are B-worlds and 
the closest B-worlds are A-worlds, then the closest A-worlds are the closest B-worlds 
and so C obtains at the former worlds iff C obtains at the latter worlds. 
 
Returning to Morgenbesser, consider the following argument where the antecedents 




Morgenbesser: Bet > Win 
(1) (Bet > Win) → (Bet > Heads) 
(2) (Bet > Heads) → ((Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads) 
(3) ((Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads) → (Toss > Heads) 
Therefore 
Coin: Toss > Heads 
 
Argument 1 is valid, so if Bennett wishes to accept Morgenbesser and reject Coin, he 
must reject one of (1) to (3). (1) to (3) are all extremely plausible, but each can be 
supported by independent argument. 
 
(1) is licensed by Limited Transitivity. The closest worlds at which you bet heads and 
win are worlds where the coin lands heads, so we have (Bet ∧ Win) > Heads. And 
this counterfactual is obviously true regardless of whether we employ a possible 
                                                 
3
 Both Causal Chain and Causal Independence* are false for reasons orthogonal to 
Conjunction Conditionalization. Causal Chain needs a proviso to deal with antecedents that 
introduce new threats to the obtaining of the consequent and Causal Independence* needs to 
be revised in the face of antecedents which only have pure-positive effects on the obtaining of 
the consequent. They can, however, both be fixed, leaving their verdicts on Coin and 
Conjunction Conditionalization intact. I hope to discuss this further in future work. 
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world semantics. Conjoined with (1)’s antecedent, this gives (1)’s consequent by 
Limited Transitivity. 
 
(2) is supported by Substitution. Since I only offer you the bet once I’ve tossed the 
coin, we have Bet > (Bet ∧ Toss). Obviously the converse, (Bet ∧ Toss) > Bet, holds 
too. Combined with the antecedent of (2), these counterfactuals yield (2)’s 
consequent by Substitution. 
 
So from applications of Substitution and Limited Transitivity we can move from 
Morgenbesser to the consequent of (2). Before considering (3), we should note that 
Bennett himself has been ambivalent about Substitution (2001, p. 201), although he 
does want to validate Limited Transitivity. (Similarly, Schaffer, who proposes an 
antecedent-independence account, seems happy to give up Substitution as he thinks 
this is required to deal with cases like Morgenbesser and Tichý (2005, p. 305 n14). 
As we have seen, however, Causal Chain also suffices.) Lewis, however, thinks 
Substitution is non-negotiable as it is validated by ‘the weakest system that has any 
claim to be called a logic of conditionals’ (1971, p. 80). Happily, however, the 
argument need not rely on Substitution, nor on Limited Transitivity for that matter. 
 
(1) is also licensed by 
 
Weakening the Consequent: ((A > B) ∧  (B → C)) → (A > C) 
 
Gloss: if the closest A-worlds are B-worlds and all B-worlds are C-worlds, then the 
closest A-worlds are C-worlds. Trivially, from Bet > Win we have Bet > (Win ∧ Bet). 
Necessarily, if you win and bet heads, the coin lands heads, so by Weakening the 
Consequent we have Bet > Heads. That is, if we reject (1), it is not the case that if 
you had bet heads the coin would have landed heads. But in that case, how can it be 
that if you had bet heads you would have won, as Morgenbesser states? 
 
(2) need not rely on Substitution, but only on very limited antecedent strengthening 
 
VLAS: ((A > B) ∧ (A > C)) → ((A ∧ B) > C) 
  
Gloss: if the closest A-worlds are B-worlds, then the closest (A ∧ B)-worlds are the 
closest A-worlds, so C is true at the former iff it is true at the latter. As noted above, 
Bet > (Bet ∧ Toss). This combined with the antecedent of (2), Bet > Heads, gives, by 
VLAS, (Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads. 
 
Unlike Substitution Bennett is committed to VLAS: ‘[VLAS] is valid. There can be no 
doubt about that’ (2003, p. 332). So we can reach the consequent of (2) via 
applications of Substitution or VLAS and Limited Transitivity or Weakening the 
Consequent.4 
 
                                                 
4
 Limited Transitivity, Substitution and VLAS are theorems of Pollock’s, Lewis’s and 
Stalnaker’s logics. Weakening the Consequent, is only a theorem when B → C is a logical 
truth and not just metaphysically necessary. Edgington (personal communication) prefers to 
think of these principles as rules of inference, but, construed as such, she accepts them. If, 
we define ‘winning’ as ‘betting heads and the coin landing heads or betting tails and the coin 
landing tails’, then we can replace ‘ (B → C)’ in Weakening the consequent with ‘├ (B → C)’. 
Williamson notes (2007: 295-296) that such a revised principle, but not Weakening the 
Consequent, is plausibly false in languages that contain a rigidifying actuality operator. Such 
issues are orthogonal to our concerns, however. 
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Another way to support (2) is to note that ((Bet ∧ ¬Toss) > ¬Heads) and that this 
combined with either of the following 
 
 ((Bet > Heads) → (((Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads) ∨ ((Bet ∧ ¬Toss) > Heads))) 
 
 ((Bet > Heads) ↔ (((Bet ∧ Toss) ∨ (Bet ∧ ¬Toss)) > Heads)) 
 
gives (Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads. In the first case by Exclusion and disjunctive syllogism, 
and in the second case, by what I call ‘Very Restricted Simplification of Disjunctive 
Antecedents’. 
 
VRSDA: (((A ∨ B) > C) ∧ (A > ¬C)) → (B > C)5 
These latter defences of (2), however, rely on the fact that Toss is a necessary 
condition of Heads and so cannot be employed when arguing for Conjunction 
Conditionalization more generally as I do in §4. However, they are important in the 
present context as they provide another route to establishing (2), which, as well as 
being a premise in the argument to Coin, is in itself significant as we shall see below. 
 
(1), is, in fact, unnecessary given that Bennett (2003, p. 237) explicitly accepts Bet > 
Heads. This is because (1) is, like Morgenbesser, entailed by Causal Independence 
and by other independence accounts. More generally, Bet > Heads is a semi-factual 
whose antecedent is irrelevant to the truth of the consequent, and so is an instance 
of a type of counterfactual that we count as true (cf. Bennett 2003, §91, Pollock 1976, 
p. 26). Consequently, we need not rely on either Limited Transitivity or Weakening 
the Consequent. So Bet > Heads, (2) and (3) also constitute an argument to Coin. 
 
In any case, given that Bennett is committed to Limited Transitivity and VLAS, he is 
committed to the consequent of (2). So the question now becomes, is (3) true? When 
discussing a version of Morgenbesser, Bennett writes 
 
At the closest worlds at which you bet on heads while I press the 
button, the fall of the coin arises from the very same chain of events: 
the button-press link in the chain is the very one that occurred [in the 
actual world], with merely a different vocal accompaniment. This 
seems to be why [we accept Morgenbesser] (2003, p. 235). 
 
So here Bennett seems to be suggesting that preservation of the actual causal chain 
is what is important: the mere presence of a vocal accompaniment makes no 
difference to whether the coin lands heads. Given that Bennett accepts 
Morgenbesser on this basis, he should also accept (3). Moreover, to reject (3) would 
be to claim that whilst it is not the case that if I tossed the coin, the coin would fall 
heads, it is the case that if I tossed the coin and you placed a bet, the coin would 
land heads. But there is no link between your betting behaviour, causal or otherwise, 
and the result of the coin toss. To reject (3) would be to claim that your betting had 
some impact on the result of the coin toss, which is absurd. Moreover the whole 
rationale for Morgenbesser is that my betting is causally independent of the result of 
the coin toss, so to deny that now undercuts the motivation for Morgenbesser. 
 
It is implausible to reject (3), but it is not inconsistent to accept a pair of the form 
(Bet ∧  Toss) > Heads and ¬(Toss > Heads). Indeed, we know from Stalnaker and 
Lewis that antecedent strengthening is an invalid argument form and similarly, 
                                                 
5
 Both conditionals and VRSDA are validated by the semantics of Pollock, Lewis and 
Stalnaker. 
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antecedent weakening is also invalid. An example adapted from Lewis (1986, p. 10): 
If the USA and all their enemies threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow, there 
would be peace. But it’s not the case that if the USA threw their weapons into the sea 
tomorrow, there would be peace. However, the cases of the failure of antecedent 
strengthening/weakening in the literature are ones where the extra material in the 
antecedent is causally relevant to the consequent. But in (3) this material is, as we 
have seen, causally and logically independent of the consequent. We might suppose, 
then, that antecedent weakening only fails when the subtraction from the antecedent 
is causally relevant to the consequent. 
 
This is not quite right, however. Imagine the following set-up: (i) C can only be 
brought about by A or by B, each of which is sufficient for C; (ii) A and B are 
themselves causally unrelated, so that whether or not A happens has no impact on 
whether or not B happens and vice versa; and (iii) none of A, B or C obtain.6 In this 
situation since A is unrelated to B, we have A > ¬B. Furthermore, we have A > C. 
These two conditionals yield (A ∧ C) > ¬B by VLAS. 
 
Now if ¬A ∧ C were the case, then B would be the case, since C can only be brought 
about by A or by B, and ¬A. So here we have a situation where we can move from (A 
∧ C) > ¬B to (¬A ∧ C) > B, even though A is unrelated to B. Of course it is easy to 
see why this is: B has to ‘step-in’ to replace A as a cause of C, if C is still to be the 
case. Moreover, it is not the case that C > ¬B, since, we may suppose, C is as likely 
to be brought about by B as by A. But, as stipulated, A is irrelevant to ¬B, so here we 
have a case of the failure of antecedent weakening, ((A ∧ C) > ¬B) ∧ ¬(C > ¬B), even 
though the subtraction from the antecedent is irrelevant to the consequent. But such 
cases are structurally very different from (3) in that the subtraction from the 
antecedent is causally relevant to whether the remainder of the antecedent obtains. 
But given that your betting is causally irrelevant both to whether the coin lands heads 
and to whether the coin is tossed, we cannot appeal to the failure of antecedent 
weakening to reject (3). 
 
So here we have an argument to show that if Morgenbesser is true then so is Coin 
and so Coin cannot represent a counterexample to Conjunction Conditionalization for 
those, like Bennett, who accept Morgenbesser. And given that Coin is true, The 
Irrelevance Principle must be false. 
 
Perhaps, however, the defender of Causal Independence* and The Irrelevance 
Principle can bite the bullet and reject (3), since together with Morgenbesser, (1) and 
(2), it violates The Irrelevance Principle by yielding Coin. But we should note that not 
only is The Irrelevance Principle under motivated, it is, in fact, completely 
unmotivated. This is because Causal Independence* is false. The consequent of (2), 
(Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads, a true semi-factual entailed by Morgenbesser and our 
principles of counterfactual logic, has an antecedent which is causally relevant to its 
consequent and so falsifies Causal Independence*. Indeed, 
 
(2) (Bet > Heads) → ((Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads) 
 
alone is sufficient to show that Causal Independence* is false. The antecedent of (2), 
Bet > Heads, is an irrelevant semi-factual entailed by Causal Independence*, so 
given (2), we can detach its consequent, (Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads, which renders 
                                                 
6
 Cases with the structure described here warrant further investigation as they are prone to 
lead us into error. For reasons of space, I cannot defend fully what I claim about such cases 
here, but I hope to in future work. 
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Causal Independence* false. But without Causal Independence*, The Irrelevance 
Principle is unmotivated, as we saw above. 
 
Moreover, similar reasoning shows that The Irrelevance Principle is false. Consider a 
situation in which you are offered and accept the bet (the defence of (2) presented 
above does not turn on your rejection of the bet). In such a situation the antecedent 
of (2), Bet > Heads, is a counterfactual with true components, whose antecedent is 
irrelevant to the obtaining of the consequent and so is entailed by The Irrelevance 
Principle. Given (2), this yields (Bet ∧ Toss) > Heads, a counterfactual with true 
components but with an antecedent relevant to the consequent. Such a conditional 
falsifies The Irrelevance Principle. 
 
So given VLAS, Substitution, VRSDA or Exclusion, all of which give (2), The 
Irrelevance Principle is false and so cannot be invoked to reject (3). The truth of (2) 
also shows that the antecedent-independence accounts of Edgington (2004), Kvart 
(1994), Noordhof (2004) and Schaffer (2004) are false and so cannot be used to 
undermine Coin.7 The same considerations falsify Causal Independence*, leaving 
Causal Chain as our only explanation of Morgenbesser and Tichý. So here we have 
the kernel of an abductive argument to Causal Chain which entails Conjunction 
Conditionalization. However, the deductive argument to Coin above can be 
generalized to the conclusion that Conjunction Conditionalization is true. 
 
 
4. Generalizing the argument 
The argument above may seem to address only one type of counterexample to 
Conjunction Conditionalization, namely those where A indeterminisitically causes C. 
Of course, there is nothing special about coin tosses, so the above argument tells 
equally against Nozick’s claim that 
 
If it is truly a random matter which slit a photon goes through, then its 
going through (say) the right slit does not establish the subjunctive: ‘if 
a photon were fired at that time from that source it would go through 
the right-hand slit’ (1981, pp. 680-681). 
 
Simply run Argument 1 replacing ‘Toss’ with ‘Photon firing’ and ‘Heads’ with ‘Right 
slit’. (Similarly we can reject Gundersen’s (2004, pp. 1-2) case of the Zen master.) 
 
Putative counterexamples to Conjunction Conditionalization are, however, often 
unlike Coin in this regard. Standardly, putative counterexamples are of four other 
types: 
 
I. There is no connection between the antecedent and consequent 
 
For example (Fine 1975, p. 359) 
 
(4) If I were to raise my little finger, there would be rainfall this Winter 
 
II. A raises the chances of C, but C does not (solely) obtain in virtue of A 
 
(5) If he had worked hard, he would have passed 
 
                                                 
7
 Noordhof and Schaffer need not count Coin as false as they could accept Lewis’s (1986) 
Strong Centring assumption. 
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is allegedly false if the student worked hard but passed only because he cheated 
(Fine 1975, p. 359). 
 
III. A lowers the chances of C, and C does not obtain in virtue of A. 
 
(6) If Caspar had come, the party would have been a good one. 
 
You erroneously believe both that Caspar did not attend the party and that the party 
was a bad one. When Caspar ruins most parties he attends, and in fact nearly ruined 
this one, then Bennett (1974) claims (6) is false. 
 
IV. A obtains in virtue of C 
 
(7) If my lawn were wet, it would be raining 
 
Butcher (1983) thinks (7) is false if it is raining and my lawn is wet. 
 
Does my argument cover such cases? Well that A caused C was not relied upon in 
Argument 1. To see this, consider the following generalization of Argument 1. Take 
any fact C that obtains from time t. I offer you a bet at t*<t on whether C will obtain or 
not, which you decline. After t I can say truthfully ‘If you had bet on C, you would 




(8) Bet > Win 
(9) (Bet > Win) → (Bet > C) 
(10) (Bet > C) → ((Bet ∧ A) > C) 
(11) ((Bet ∧ A) > C) → (A > C) 
Therefore 
(12) A > C 
 
Argument 2 is simply a generalization of Argument 1. (8) is my truthful utterance after 
you declined the bet and C came about. (9) is licensed by Limited Transitivity or 
Weakening the Consequent. (10) is licensed by Substitution / VLAS: ‘(Bet ∧ A) > Bet’ 
is trivially true and ‘Bet > (Bet ∧ A)’ is true assuming the past is counterfactually 
independent of our wager, so that regardless of whether I offer and you accept the 
bet, A  obtains. (11) follows from the fact that whether C obtains is independent of my 
betting. 
 
In fact A need not be a fact that obtains before I offer the bet, although this is a 
particularly vivid example. As long as A obtains independently of the wager, we 
should assent to Bet > (Bet ∧ A), and this is what we need to establish (10). This is 
important if Argument 2 is to cover (7). So no matter how infelicitous I to IV are, we 
are committed to endorsing them, if we accept Morgenbesser. 
 
One might object that there is something funny about betting that changes the 
context (cf. Vessell (2003 pp. 117-118)) and so what the argument above really 
shows is not that Conjunction Conditionalization is true, but rather that there is a shift 
in context.8 But the argument can be reformulated without reference to gambling. As I 
noted in §3, we can move directly from the semi-factual ‘Bet > Heads’ and (2) and (3) 
                                                 
8
 Note that adopting the contextually-sensitive strict conditional semantics of would-
counterfactuals endorsed by von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) does not avoid argument 2. 
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to Coin. But there is nothing special about ‘Bet > Heads’; any semi-factual with an 
irrelevant antecedent will do. So instead of ‘Bet’ we can instead employ any B such 




(13) (B > C) 
(14) (B > C) → ((B ∧ A) > C) 
(15) ((B ∧ A) > C) → (A > C) 
Therefore 
(12) A > C 
 
(13) is our irrelevant semi-factual, and (14) is licensed by B > (B ∧ A) and either of 
Substitution or VLAS, and (15) by the fact that whether C obtains is independent of 
B. 
 
In certain circumstances, however, there will be no such B. For instance, let C be a 
proposition that only holds at the world of assessment so that ¬B > ¬C. Because of 
this, Argument 3 falls short of establishing Conjunction Conditionalization in its full 
generality. To reject Conjunction Conditionalization on this basis, however, would be 
extremely ill-motivated. 
 
Conjunction Conditionalization is, then, non-negotiable for those who accept the truth 
of semi-factuals with irrelevant antecedents or counterfactuals that turn on them, 
such as Morgenbesser. Given that these conditionals are central to our 
counterfactual reasoning, the rejection of Conjunction Conditionalization would mean 
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